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Abstract 
Poverty alleviation is an important objective of European countries and of the United States. If 
these ‘rich’ states offer elaborate systems of income maintenance, why is there still a considerable 
amount of poverty? And why are anti-poverty outcomes so different in the United States compared 
to European countries?  
This paper completes a trilogy of cross-country research papers on anti-poverty policy. Two former 
papers analyzed the effects of social transfers on both poverty levels and poverty alleviation 
through tax and social transfer systems. These papers marked the United States as an outlier: high 
poverty rates, low public social spending but high private social expenditures, a rather strong belief 
that people are poor because of laziness or lack of will, and remarkable differences across the 
Federal States caused by state discretion. Therefore, this paper analyzes U.S. welfare in more 
detail; we focus on part of the major welfare reform in 1996.  
The 1996 welfare reform emphasizes an American preference for work. Indeed, the welfare reform 
increased work, although the earnings of most individuals who left welfare were still below the 
poverty line, even many years after their exit. A drawback of this work-first approach is the 
termination of cash assistance after 5 years, especially for vulnerable groups with low skills. Recent 
economic recession can cause severe troubles; one could - for example – argue that recipients who 
reach time limits without meeting work requirements should be offered a chance to work in 
community service jobs in return for cash assistance. We found huge variation of welfare eligibility 
rights across states, depending on ability to pay and preferences to meet a certain level of social 
standard and other (social) objectives such as child care, work support and employment programs. 
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“No one who works full-time and has children at home 
should be poor anymore. No one who can work should be 
able to stay on welfare forever.” 
(Presidential candidate Clinton, 1992 campaign speech) 
 
“In the absences of a renewed antipoverty effort, many 
households will continue to be unable to afford adequate 
food, housing, and shelter. Our high poverty rate 
contributes to an erosion of social cohesion, a waste of the 
human capital of a portion of our citizenry, and the moral 
discomfort of condoning poverty amidst affluence.” 
(Scholz, Moffit and Cowan, 2008, p. 31) 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Poverty alleviation is an important objective of the European Union. The poverty problem is 
also striking in other highly-developed welfare states, such as the United States. 
Industrialized countries spend a large share of their budget on income maintenance, but 
poverty has not been eradicated. A sizable proportion of the population lives in economic 
poverty in all industrial welfare states. According to the most common standards used in 
international poverty analyses, on average roughly one in ten households live in relative 
poverty in OECD countries (OECD, 2008). The persistence of poverty in industrial welfare 
states calls for an explanation. If these welfare states offer elaborate systems of income 
maintenance, why is there still a considerable amount of poverty? And why are anti-poverty 
outcomes so different in the United States compared to European countries? 
This paper is part of a trilogy of cross-country research papers on anti-poverty policy. Two 
former analyses report some profound differences between EU15 and non-EU15 countries; the 
United States is a special case (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2009 and 2010). Both analyses 
took into account 28 OECD countries and distinguished between EU15 countries and non-
EU15 countries to investigate if both groups of countries generate (dis)similar anti-poverty 
effects with their systems of income transfers. The overall result of both quantitative studies 
seems to be that there is negative correlation between poverty respectively, poverty 
reduction, and social expenditures across countries over the last 25 years, although this result 
depends on the social spending indicator used. The effect of tax and transfer policies in 
reducing poverty is analyzed by comparing poverty rates at the level of market and 
disposable income, that is before and after social transfers, i.e. to determine the target 
efficiency of social transfers across countries. This kind of comparison may guide us to cross-
country differences on poverty alleviation.  
It appears that the United States is an outlier in several respects (cf. Smeeding, 2005a, 
2005b and 2006). Government policies and social spending have lesser effects in the United 
States than in any other rich nation, and both low spending and low wages have a great 
impact on the final income distribution, especially among the non-elderly (Smeeding, 2005a, 
p. 955). Smeeding’s analysis points to American institutions and lack of spending effort on 
behalf of low-income working families. Indeed, the United States stands out in the relative 
position of those at the bottom of the income distribution. Moreover, Smeedings’ thorough 
analysis shows that countries with higher levels of government spending (as in Scandinavia 
and northern Europe) and more careful targeting of government transfers at the poor (as in 
Canada, Sweden, and Finland) produce lower poverty rates. Smeeding finds that the effects 
of the income package accounted for over 90 percent of the differences in income inequality 
- 1 - 
across nations. He claims that the U.S. redistributive package is the prime explainer of the 
differences. Therefore, this paper analyzes U.S. welfare in more detail; we focus on a part of 
the U.S.’s major welfare reform in 1996. 
This paper completes our trilogy of cross-country research on anti-poverty policy. We first 
highlight why the United States is an outlier among ‘rich’ countries: high poverty rates, low 
public social spending but high private social expenditures, a rather strong belief that people 
are poor because of laziness or lack of will, and remarkable differences across the Federal 
States caused by state discretion. Next, this paper analyzes U.S. welfare in more detail. The 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some background of the combat against 
poverty in Europe and in the United States. Section 3 gives a descriptive overview of the U.S. 
safety net. Next, we investigate welfare reform in the United States in more detail in section 
4. Our reading of the literature presents an overview of the effects of welfare reform in the 
United States in section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. POVERTY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND IN THE UNITED STATES - IS THE U.S. 
DIFFERENT? 
 
2.1 A world of difference 
This section highlights some of the differences with regard to social spending and poverty 
reduction between the U.S. and the other OECD countries. Clearly, national preferences play a 
role in explaining the differences in social spending across countries, but there may be other 
factors as well, such as the structure of the labor market, the level of fractionalization (race), 
country size, and so on. In their timely study of the different approaches of America and 
Europe to the problems of domestic inequality and poverty, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) 
describe just how different America and Europe are in the level of State engagement in the 
redistribution of income. They discuss various possible economic explanations for the 
difference, including different levels of pre-tax income, openness of the economy, and social 
mobility. Moreover, they survey politico-historical differences such as the varying physical size 
of nations, their electoral and legal systems, and the character of their political parties, as 
well as their experiences of war. Finally, they examine sociological explanations which include 
different attitudes to the poor and notions of social responsibility, as well as, most 
importantly, attitudes to race. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) conclude that the reasons why 
Americans and Europeans differ on their choices over welfare state and redistribution run very 
deep into their different history and culture. No simple economic theory provides a one-line 
answer. Instead, ethnic heterogeneity and political institutions seem to explain most of the 
differences. Especially the importance of ethnic fractionalization is emphasized by Alesina and 
Glaeser. Compared to Europe, the U.S. is a highly heterogeneous society that is particularly 
distinguished by overrepresentation among the poor of the most visible and socially distinct 
minorities. As such, it has always been easy for opponents of welfare to use racial and ethnic 
divisions to attack redistribution (p. 181). Estimates of Alesina and Glaeser (2004) show that 
racial fractionalization can explain approximately one-half of the differences in the degree of 
redistribution between the U.S. and Europe (p. 13).  
 
2.2 Poverty rates 
In the European Union people are said to be at risk of income poverty if their incomes are 
below 60 percent of the median disposable income of households in their country, after 
adjusting for household size (equivalence scales). For comparison, the official United States 
poverty line was just about 30 percent of median United States disposable post-tax household 
income in 2007.1 Based on the EU-agreed definition, the proportion of the EU15-population 
                                            
1  U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey reports for 2007 a poverty threshold for a 4-persons family 
(weighted average) of $21,203; median disposable income for 4-persons families amounts $69,654. 
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who was at risk of poverty in 2007 is 17 percent. The comparable figure for the United States 
is higher: 24 percent. 
The U.S. poverty threshold is based on an absolute poverty standard, which remains fixed 
over time in real terms. According to U.S. poverty definition, 12.5 percent of the population 
was living in poverty in 2007. The U.S. official measure of poverty is typically in the form of 
the cost of a basket of goods and services required to assure minimum living conditions and 
indexed for price changes over time. While the threshold is adjusted annually based on 
inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U), the measure is absolute and has been 
essentially unchanged since it was developed by Mollie Orshansky at the United States Social 
Security Administration in 1964 (National Poverty Center, University of Michigan). The poverty 
threshold estimates the rate of poverty in the United States by determining the number of 
households whose annual income is below the set threshold for the household’s size. The 
determination of poverty is made based solely on income and cash benefits. Noncash benefits, 
such as food stamps and housing subsidies, are not included in the determination of a 
household’s poverty (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007).  
Reports on relative poverty profiles for OECD countries for the latest data year available 
consistently show – in general - Scandinavian and Benelux countries have the lowest poverty 
rates, followed by continental European countries. Anglo Saxon welfare states have relatively 
higher poverty rates. Among them, the level of poverty is highest in the United States.2 
Using the official absolute poverty measurement from the U.S. (Orshansky-poverty) alters the 
picture to some extent. Notten and De Neubourg (2007) estimate that according to the 
Orshansky-methodology for years 1996 and 2000, that while U.S. has a high poverty rate, it 
is not significantly different from the rate established in most European countries using the 
Orshansky measure, while Greece, Spain and Portugal have figures four times higher than the 
United States. It should however be noted that their result is rather sensitive for the 
purchasing power parity rates used to convert the U.S. poverty lines to country specific 
thresholds of EU15.  
In spite of differences in the measurement of poverty, most studies have consistently found 
that there is a large difference in poverty rates between (most) European countries and the 
United States. 
 
2.3 Anti-poverty policy 
Poverty alleviation has been a European objective since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. In 2000 
the European Council adopted the goal that in addition to economic growth, social cohesion 
should be strengthened in the EU (the Lisbon Agenda). The open method of coordination was 
introduced as the means of spreading best practices and achieving greater convergence 
towards the main EU-goals. Social indicators were developed to monitor the improvements 
with respect to social cohesion. The Lisbon Agenda has renewed the interest in poverty 
alleviation across member states. However, there is still a sizable proportion of the EU15 
population living in poverty (17 percent), although both poverty structure and poverty rates 
vary across countries from 10 percent in the Netherlands to about 20 percent in Greece, Italy 
and Spain. Moreover, the average at-risk-of-poverty rates – an official EU social cohesion 
indicator – have risen since the adoption of the Lisbon Agenda. 
The income poverty reduction goal for the United States was officially declared by President 
Johnson in 1964: “We cannot and need not wait for the gradual growth of the economy to lift 
this forgotten fifth of our Nation above the poverty line” (Danziger, 2007, p. 3). President 
Johnson’s 1964 State of the Union speech emphasized structural factors as primary causes of 
poverty, including, “...our failure to give our fellow citizens a fair chance to develop their own 
capacities, in a lack of education and training, in a lack of medical care and housing, in a lack 
of decent communities in which to live....”. The prevailing view at that time was that the poor 
                                            
2  See Caminada and Goudswaard (2009 and 2010) for details. Data and analyses on poverty rates and 
poverty alleviation among OECD countries are available from Caminada’s webpage: 
http://www.law.leiden.edu/organisation/taxlawandeconomics/economics/staff/caminada.html.  
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did not work because of excessive unemployment or, if they did work, they earned an 
insufficient amount in less-skilled jobs.  In spite of the pronounced “War on Poverty”, income 
poverty was not eliminated by 1980, as planned. Even today, the U.S. is far from fulfilling the 
vision of the “War on Poverty” declared by President Johnson. What went wrong? Broadly 
speaking, most social scientists point at three ‘causes’. (1) Critics have blamed the growth of 
antipoverty programs themselves. Especially the Reagan-administration which criticized the 
adverse incentives for welfare recipients to accept (low-) paid jobs. (2) Other critics argued 
that eliminating income poverty was not as important a goal as changing the personal 
behaviors of the poor. (3) Several macro-economic circumstances (oil shocks) failed to deliver 
the benefits of economic growth among U.S. society equally. 
 
It should be mentioned that the European Union has emphasized the multidimensional nature 
of deprivation, and have developed supplementary indicators of poverty based on social 
indicators and the broad concept of social exclusion. The European Union has defined common 
objectives on social indicators - based on Atkinson et al (2002) - to be benchmarked by the 
streamlined Open Method of Coordination. Both data and measurement techniques have been 
developed in order to capture a variety of dimensions of deprivation beyond money income 
(poverty). On the contrary, the United States solely focus on the income dimension of 
poverty, although influential scientists argue that moving towards broader measures of 
poverty that take into consideration indicators of material deprivation and social exclusion has 
a number of advantages (e.g. Haveman, 2008). 
 
2.4 Social spending and anti-poverty effects 
Table 1 provides a picture of poverty rates and several social expenditure ratios for EU15 
countries and the United States. Poverty rates are from the Luxembourg Income Study 
(2009) and from OECD (2008). Three relative poverty lines are applied, and income is 
adjusted using equivalence scales. The figures show that the U.S. combines relatively high 
poverty rates with rather low social spending, albeit depending on the social spending indictor 
used. 
 
Table 1: Poverty rates and social spending in EU15 countries and in the United States 
 
 Poverty total population Social expenditure in % GDP, 2005 
 LIS (around 2001) OECD (2003-2005) 
  PL40 PL50 PL60 PL40 PL50 PL60 
Gross 
public 
Gross 
public 
and 
private 
Idem, 
excluding 
Health 
Net  
public 
and 
private 
 
EU15 
 
4.6 
 
9.4 
 
16.0 
 
4.7 
 
9.4 
 
16.4 
 
24.1 
 
26.9 
 
19.6 
 
23.0 
Austria 3.6 7.7 13.4 3.4 6.6 13.4 27.2 29.1 21.8 23.5 
Belgium 3.7 8.1 16.1 3.1 8.8 16.2 26.4 30.9 23.1 26.8 
Denmark 2.3 5.6 13.2 2.1 5.3 12.3 26.9 29.5 23.5 21.6 
Finland 2.5 6.5 13.5 2.8 7.3 14.8 24.0 25.1 18.7 19.5 
France 2.8 7.3 13.7 2.8 7.1 14.1 29.2 32.2 23.0 29.0 
Germany 4.6 8.4 13.4 6.3 11.0 17.2 26.7 29.7 21.0 27.0 
Greece 8.6 14.3 21.4 7.0 12.6 19.6 20.5 22.2 16.6 n.a. 
Ireland 7.4 16.2 22.5 7.0 14.8 23.3 16.7 18.1 11.0 16.1 
Italy 7.4 12.8 20.0 6.6 11.4 19.7 25.0 27.0 20.1 23.1 
Luxembourg 3.2 8.8 13.7 3.1 8.1 13.2 23.2 24.3 17.1 20.3 
Netherlands 2.5 4.9 11.1 4.0 7.7 14.4 20.9 29.2 21.4 23.3 
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.4 12.9 20.7 22.9 23.8 16.2 21.4 
Spain 7.6 14.2 20.8 8.1 14.1 21.0 21.2 21.7 15.4 19.1 
Sweden 2.6 5.6 12.0 2.5 5.3 11.4 29.4 32.2 25.4 24.8 
United Kingdom 5.4 11.6 19.2 3.7 8.3 15.5 21.3 28.4 20.4 25.9 
           
United States 11.4 17.3 24.1 11.4 17.1 23.9 15.9 26.0 13.2 25.3 
 
Source: LIS (2009), OECD (2008), SOCX (2008) 
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In all OECD countries, public cash benefits and taxes significantly reduce poverty. As reported 
by OECD (2008, p. 291-292), most of the redistribution towards people at the bottom of the 
income scale is generally achieved through public cash benefits – with the main exception 
being the United States, where a large part of the support provided to low-income families is 
administered through the income tax system (EITC). These cross-country differences in the 
scale of redistribution partly reflect differences in the size and structure of social spending. 
OECD countries redistribute in a variety of ways – some through universal benefits, others 
with more targeted programs, some primarily relying on transfers, others primarily granting 
tax rebates to low-income families.  
Caminada and Goudswaard (2009) calculate the reduction of poverty rates of market income 
and disposable income across 25 OECD countries. They show that EU15 countries generate an 
antipoverty effect of 19.0 percentage points on average, while non-EU15-countries produce 
on average a lower antipoverty effect of 14.7 percentage points among their population. On 
the bottom of the country rankings we find Korea and the United States with antipoverty 
effects of less than 10 percentage points.  
Each percentage point of total social expenditure alleviates poverty in EU15 by .7 percentage 
points on average. A much lower score is found for the United States (.35). The targeted 
effectiveness of the United States is remarkably low, and lies just below half of the average of 
all countries. Two specific factors seem to be of importance. First, a threshold of 50 percent of 
median income is applied, while U.S. social policies target lower levels of income to lift people 
out of poverty. Second, the United States devotes the smallest share of its resources to public 
antipoverty income transfer programs across the countries examined (cf. Smeeding, 2005). 
However, when private social expenditures are also taken into account, this picture changes. 
In that case, the United States ranks fifth when all 25 countries are ordered on the basis of 
their level of total social expenditures. Therefore, public versus private social expenditures 
may have opposite antipoverty effects (cf. Caminada and Goudswaard, 2005). In any case, 
the large cross-country differences in the antipoverty effect of social transfers and taxes – 
with exceptionally low scores for the U.S. - call for further investigation. 
 
2.5 National preferences for social spending 
National preferences for social protection differ substantially across countries. Anglo-Saxon 
countries do not seem to be prepared to sustain the high protection levels prevailing in other 
countries with the same levels of income. Swabish et al (2006) assembled data to examine 
the cross-national effects of income inequality and trust on social expenditures. Their results 
suggest that as the ‘rich’ become more distant from the middle and lower classes; they find it 
easier to opt out of public programs and to buy substitutes for social insurance in the private 
market. These cultural differences within the group of OECD countries could point to variance 
in the antipoverty nature of social systems as well. Anglo-Saxon welfare states (especially the 
United States) rely more heavily on private social arrangements as far as pensions, health 
care and other programs are concerned (Super, 2008). However, private social programs may 
generate a more limited redistribution of resources than public ones, and tax advantages 
towards private pension and health plans are more likely to benefit the rich. Moreover, the 
burden of poverty on individuals and families depends not just on its size but also on how 
others in society view its nature, in particular whether poverty is perceived as the result of 
individual attitudes or of the way society is organized (OECD, 2008, p. 131). Figure 1 shows 
the share of respondents who believe that people are poor because of laziness or lack of will, 
on one side, or because society is unfair, on the other. In general, the share of respondents 
who believe that poverty reflects laziness is greater in the United States than in the Nordic 
and Continental European countries.3  
                                            
3  See for more details on why Americans hate welfare the thoroughly analysis of Gilens (1999). Gilens 
reviews survey data to suggest that Americans supported the welfare retrenchment of 1996 based on the 
mistaken assumption that most welfare recipients were not trying to achieve personal responsibility in 
regards to work and family. Moreover, Gilens's work punctures myths and misconceptions about welfare 
policy, public opinion, and the role of the media in both. The public's views on welfare seems to be a 
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Figure 1: Subjective attitudes to poverty - share of respondents attributing poverty to 
different reasons 
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Source: OECD (2008, p. 131) 
 
 
2.6 Policy Coordination Mechanism to Combat Poverty 
In December 2000, the Nice European Council launched the open method of coordination on 
social inclusion (soft law). This governance methodology was modeled on the treaty-based 
European Employment Strategy and includes agreement on common EU objectives and 
(income poverty) indicators, the adoption of National Action Plans on Inclusion, and periodic 
monitoring and peer review. It should be noted that ‘coordination’ is a mercurial term in the 
context of OMC (Armstrong, 2006); however, policy competence remains with the member 
states. 
In the United States, responsibility for antipoverty policy has shifted since 1996 from the 
antipoverty agencies of the federal government to the individual U.S. states and to the tax 
code (EITC). The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
provides block grants to states with few restrictions. States were required to spend at least 75 
percent of their previous level of welfare spending, and states had to meet targets for moving 
recipients into work activities. Thus, the European Union employs “soft law” as a policy 
coordination mechanism, while in the U.S. “hard law” is applied. Furthermore, while the 
majority of welfare funding is provided by the federal government in the United States, an 
above-state budget for poverty alleviation is lacking in Europe, based on the principle of 
subsidiarity. Finally, policy goals for reducing poverty rates are rather vague and do not aspire 
to a specified target on either side of the Atlantic. 
 
 
3. U.S. SAFETY NET  
 
3.1 Mean-tested benefits4 
Just as a primer, this section highlights the U.S. safety net. We focus solely on the main 
mean-tested benefits, because these programs have explicit antipoverty goals. Means-tested 
programs are financed by general tax revenues; all restrict benefits to those whose incomes 
and or assets fall below an established threshold. Some are entitlements - all who satisfy the 
stipulated eligibility requirements get benefits, regardless of the total budgetary cost (e.g. 
                                                                                                                                        
complex mixture of cynicism and compassion; misinformed and racially charged, they nevertheless reflect 
both a distrust of welfare recipients and a desire to do more to help the "deserving" poor.  
4  This section summarizes a comprehensive study of Scholz et al (2008) on trends in income support in the 
United States. 
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Food Stamps). Other means-tested programs provide benefits only until the funds Congress 
or a state has allocated are spent even if some eligible participants are not served (e.g. 
TANF).  
Table 2 summarizes the evolution of means-tested (antipoverty) spending.5 Note that there 
has been a sharp reduction in cash entitlements for poor families in past decades in the 
United States. The nature of programs has changed as well. Cash welfare benefits, for 
example, have been tied to work requirements, partly in response to evolving views about the 
nature of the poverty problem. Responsibility for antipoverty policy has broadened from the 
antipoverty agencies of the federal government to those in the U.S. states and to the tax 
code, as evidenced by the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). 
 
Table 2: Total means-tested benefits by program, 1970-2007 
 
 
AFDC / 
TANF EITC 
Food 
Stamps 
Housing 
Aid 
School Food 
Programs WIC 
Head 
Start 
          
 Constant 2007 dollars, billions 
1970 26.5  3.0 2.7 3.6  1.7 
1975 36.6 4.8 16.9 8.2 7.4 0.3 1.6 
1980 33.8 5.0 21.9 13.8 9.1 1.8 1.8 
1985 31.5 4.0 20.7 22.0 7.3 2.9 2.1 
1990 34.9 12.0 22.4 24.6 7.1 3.4 2.5 
1995 40.9 35.3 31.0 37.3 8.5 4.7 4.8 
2000 27.2 38.9 18.0 34.7 9.1 4.8 6.3 
2005 22.0 45.0 30.3 40.0 10.6 5.3 7.3 
2006 21.1  31.0 39.1 10.5 5.2 7.0 
2007     30.3 39.4 10.9 5.5   
 Index: 1980 = 100 
1970 78  14 20 40  94 
1975 108 96 77 59 81 17 89 
1980 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1985 93 80 95 159 80 161 117 
1990 103 240 102 178 78 189 139 
1995 121 706 142 270 93 261 267 
2000 80 778 82 251 100 267 350 
2005 65 900 138 290 116 294 406 
2006 62  142 283 115 289 389 
2007     138 286 120 306   
 
Abbreviations:  
AFDC = Aid to Families with Dependent Children  
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families  
EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit  
WIC = supplemental nutrition program for women, infants and children 
 
Source: Scholz et al (2008, pp. 48-49) 
 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was the central safety net program for poor 
families with children from 1936 to 1996. This program was directed primarily at single-
parent families, though some two-parent families with an unemployed parent received 
benefits. In 1996 the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant (TANF) was 
created. A 5-year lifetime limit was imposed on receipt cash assistance (some hardship 
exemptions were allowed), and states had to meet targets for moving recipients into work 
activities. Note - for now - that benefits for ADFC/TANF declined from a peak of about $40 
billion in 1995 to about $21 billion in 2006. 
In contrast, expenditures on the earned income tax credit (EITC) have grown sharply from $5 
billion in 1975 to $45 billion in 2005. No other federal antipoverty program has grown so 
rapidly. The EITC is now US’s largest cash antipoverty program. The incentives embedded in 
                                            
5  Annex A presents figures for means-tested Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income as well. 
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the EITC differ from those in AFDC/TANF. AFDC recipients with no earnings received the 
largest welfare payments. In contrast, the EITC encourages low-skilled workers to enter the 
labor market, since non-earners do not receive the credit and the EITC amount rises with 
earnings up to about the poverty line. 
The safety net for low-income families includes in-kind benefit programs, the largest of which 
are food stamps, housing assistance, Head Start, school nutrition programs and the special 
supplemental nutrition program for women, infants and children (WIC).  
Food stamps are designed to enable low-income households to purchase a nutritionally 
adequate low-cost diet. Between 1994 and 2000, real food stamp expenditures fell to $18 
billion from $32 billion, even though only modest changes to food stamp program rules were 
made by the 1996 welfare reform. Food stamp participation and spending increased sharply 
between 2000 and 2005. Factors affecting these developments include increases in the 
number of poor people over this period, and the use of food stamps as federal disaster aid for 
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma as well as other natural disasters. 
The safety net housing assistance programs assist aid in two principal forms: project-based 
aid, where subsidies are tied to units constructed for low-income households, and household-
based subsidies, where renters choose housing units in the existing private housing stock.  
The school lunch and breakfast programs provide federal support for meals served by public 
and private nonprofit elementary and secondary schools and residential child care institutions 
that enroll and offer free or reduced-price meals to low-income children. The special 
supplemental nutrition program for women, infants and children (WIC) provides vouchers for 
food purchase, supplemental food, and nutrition risk screening and related nutrition oriented 
services to low-income pregnant women and low-income women and their children (up to age 
5).  
Head Start is an early childhood education program to improve social competence, learning 
skills, health and the nutrition status of low-income children so that they can begin school on 
an equal basis with their more advantaged peers. 
 
3.2 Case loads and poverty effect 
The U.S. safety net has changed in striking ways for the nonelderly; Table 2 showed the 
reduction in AFDC/TANF expenditures, which historically went to non-workers, and the 
increase in EITC benefits, which go overwhelmingly to low-income workers with children. The 
welfare reform of 1996 encouraged welfare recipients of the former ADFC to enter the labor 
market. The tighter eligibility rules of TANF and policy orientated increases of the EITC – in 
combination with rapid economic growth - ‘caused’ a sharp decrease in the number of welfare 
recipients since 1996. However, the decline of the number of welfare recipients (AFDC/TANF) 
from 12.3 million to 4.5 million in the period 1996-2005 (63 percent) didn’t change 
unemployment that much during this period; see Figure 2. 
Welfare-dependency fell sharply over 50 percent in a few years, while the EITC accounted for 
an increase of low-skilled jobs; see Figure 2.6 Studies have shown that the EITC has 
encouraged large numbers of single parents to leave welfare and enter into work. The 
Committee for Economic Development, an organization of 250 corporate executives and 
university presidents, concluded in 2000 that “[t]he EITC has become a powerful force in 
                                            
6  The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a tax benefit for low- and moderate-income workers that helps to 
offset their payroll and income taxes. Very low-wage workers can also receive an income supplement 
through the EITC: if the size of the credit exceeds the amount of tax owed, an individual will receive the 
difference (in the form of a refund check). Twenty-four States have established their own EITCs to 
supplement the federal EITC. Working families with children that have annual incomes below about $34,000 
to $41,000 (depending on marital status and the number of children in the family) generally are eligible for 
the EITC. Also, poor workers without children that have incomes below about $13,000 ($16,000 for a 
married couple) can receive a very small EITC (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2008).  
 In the 2005 tax year, some 26.5 million working families and individuals received the EITC. Among families 
with children, the average EITC was $2,375. For some workers, the EITC can represent up to a 40 percent 
pay increase. Research indicates that families use the EITC to pay for necessities, repair homes, maintain 
vehicles that are needed to commute to work, and in some cases, obtain additional education or training to 
boost their employability and earning power (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2008). 
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dramatically raising the employment of low-income women in recent years.” In 2005, the 
EITC lifted 5.0 million people out of poverty, including 2.6 million children. Without the EITC, 
the poverty rate among children would have been nearly one-fourth higher. The EITC lifts 
more children out of poverty than any other single program or category of programs (Center 
on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2008). 
 
Figure 2: Number of recipients AFDC/TANF and EITC, and Unemployment, 1970-2007 
(millions) 
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Source: Scholz et al (2008, pp. 50-51); see Annex B for details. 
 
 
A recent evaluation by Danziger (2009) suggests that, in its first few years, the 1996 welfare 
reform was more successful in some dimensions (notably, reducing caseloads) than in others 
(raising disposable income). The dramatic caseload decline has not caused the surge in 
poverty or homelessness that many critics of the 1996 Act predicted, because most former 
recipients are finding jobs. Even though many welfare leavers are not working full-time, full-
year, and many are working at low-wage jobs, a significant number are earning at least as 
much as they had received in cash welfare benefits and some now have higher net income. 
However, despite the large caseload reduction, the U.S. poverty rate has fallen rather little. 
Many who have left welfare for work remain poor and continue to depend on Food Stamps, 
Medicaid, and other government assistance; others have left welfare and remain poor but do 
not receive the Food Stamp or Medicaid benefits to which they remain entitled. The extent of 
economic hardship remains high because, many former and current welfare recipients have 
limited earnings prospects in a labor market that increasingly demands higher skills. For 
example, the end of entitlement has meant that some single mothers, with poor labor market 
prospects and no other means of support, have not received the benefits they would have 
under the pre-1996 welfare system. For single mothers with a high school degree or less, 
despite their increased work hours and earnings over the last decade, about 43 percent 
remain poor by the official definition (Danziger, 2007, p. 9). 
 
3.3 Social spending 
Between 1975, the first year the EITC existed, and 2005, total spending on all means-tested 
cash and in-kind transfers in Table 2 averaged 2.0 percent of GDP, ranging between 1.8 and 
2.5 percent. In 2005, it was 1.8 percent of GDP, near its 31-year low. These patterns are 
driven by substantial changes in the antipoverty policy mix. Why has U.S. anti-poverty 
spending been low and relatively stable given its persistent and high poverty rates? 
The contrast in levels in social expenditures between the U.S. and other OECD countries is 
striking. Smeeding (2008) calculates a consistent set of social expenditures (including cash, 
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near-cash, and housing expenditures) as a percentage of GDP for five groups of counties – 
Scandinavia; Northern Continental Europe; Central and Southern Europe; “Anglo” (Australia, 
Canada, and the U.K.); and the United States – between 1980 and 1999. Spending ranges 
between 2.7 to 3.6 percent of GDP in the U.S., a far lower level than every other country 
group. The other Anglo countries averaged between 4.8 and 7.8 percent of GDP, similar to 
the Central and Southern European counties. Northern Europe and the Scandinavian countries 
averaged between 8.1 and 15.3 percent of GDP. The trends across country groups vary, 
though most country groups increased expenditures as a share of GDP between 1980 and 
1999. The U.S. did not. 
 
3.4 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act  
From 1935 until 1996 the centerpiece of the United States Federal Government (U.S.F.G.) 
welfare policy was a program entitled Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) whose 
principal benefit was the provision of cash assistance to needy families. In 1996, however, the 
U.S.F.G. dramatically shifted its poverty reduction strategies by implementing large-scale 
social welfare reform aimed at making ‘welfare a transition to work’ by officially becoming a 
temporary assistance program (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996).7 The 
legislative basis for the reform was the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA).8 The PRWORA terminated the AFDC program.9 In place 
of AFDC, PRWORA introduced a new program known as Block Grants for Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). 
There are significant differences between TANF and the AFDC program that it supplanted in 
1996. TANF marked a break from the policy objectives, eligibility rules, funding, time 
limitations and work requirements under AFDC. The changes have had serious implications for 
the families who continue to receive benefits under TANF as well as for those families who no 
longer participate. In the United States today, 13 years after the PRWORA was passed and 
TANF replaced AFDC, it is not clear that the reform has achieved the intended results 
(Danziger, 2009). 
 
The remainder of this working paper details the most significant differences between AFDC 
and TANF. We begin by examining the underlying tenants and policy objectives of the two 
programs including the impact that increased U.S. State discretion has had on welfare in the 
United States. Following the policy overview, the paper surveys the literature evaluating the 
successes and failures of welfare reform. Finally, the paper considers some of welfare reform’s 
unintended consequences and the overall impact of welfare reform on the U.S.’s neediest 
families.  
  
 
4. POLICY OVERVIEW 
 
The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
was incredibly controversial.  It was considered by many in the social policy and political 
communities to be too great a compromise with very conservative members of the United 
States Congress; even leading to the resignation of several presidential advisors and officials 
                                            
7  Welfare reform included a series of policy changes, most notably the passage of the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. For this paper, welfare reform refers to a component of that Act, 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and its relationship to the prior law, Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children. 
8  The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, included the Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families Block Grants as a component, which is the primary matter of discussion in this paper. However, the 
legislation’s passage also included almost 55 million dollars in cuts to low-income assistance programs 
including: food stamps, benefits to legal immigrants, and the SSI program for children with disabilities. 
PRWORA also included a child support enforcement system as well as provided mandatory funds ($50 
million annually) in abstinence education funding. 
9  TANF replaced not only AFDC, but also two accompanying programs, the Emergency Assistance Program 
and the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Program.  
- 10 - 
at the United States Department of Health and Human Services.  One such advisor, former 
assistant secretary of children and families, Mary Jo Bane, in an article titled “Welfare as We 
Might Know It,” in The American Prospect (January/February 1997), stated, “The public, 
rightly, wanted welfare reform that expected work and parental responsibility. The political 
rhetoric supporting the new law, unfortunately, made the concept of a federal entitlement 
synonymous with irresponsibility and lifelong dependency, and the replacement of the 
entitlement with block grants synonymous with work requirements. This rhetoric was 
misleading but powerfully effective.” (Cabe, 2002).   
 
4.1 Policy objectives 
The underlying purpose of U.S.F.G. welfare policy has always been to reduce poverty by 
providing assistance to the country’s neediest families. While this fundamental mission 
remained unchanged following the welfare reform of 1996, the policy tools used to achieve 
that mission, and the programs implemented, changed significantly with the passage of the 
PRWORA. The replacement of the country’s primary cash assistance program, from AFDC to 
TANF, represented not only a change in name, but a serious policy shift that revised poverty 
reduction strategies throughout the United States. 
AFDC was established through the Social Security Act of 1935. The policy’s objective was to 
reduce poverty through the provision of cash welfare to needy children suffering from lack of 
parental support due to their mother or father being incapacitated, deceased, absent from the 
home or unemployed (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2004). AFDC was 
accompanied by employment training and education program called the Job Opportunities and 
Basic Skills Program (JOBS) and an emergency cash assistance program called Emergency 
Assistance (EA).10 Although the funding for these programs was separate from AFDC funding, 
individuals could participate in the JOBS program only if they also participated in AFDC (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 1996).  
AFDC was administered and supervised by U.S. States but was strongly regulated according 
to guidelines issued by the U.S.F.G. The U.S.F.G. established eligibility rules for the AFDC 
program, while the individual U.S. States set their own benefit levels and established income 
and resource limits (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2004). AFDC benefit 
levels established by U.S. States were required to be uniformly applied to all families with 
similar circumstances within the State (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
1996). 
In 1996, under the Clinton Administration, the passage of the PRWORA came with the 
promise to “change welfare as we know it” (The Urban Institute, 2006). The principal vehicle 
for achieving this change was the introduction of TANF to replace AFDC. TANF terminated 
open-ended welfare funding and instituted a block grant program providing each U.S. State 
meeting certain criteria with a fixed sum and increased flexibility in policy choice. AFDC was 
considered open-ended because U.S. States were entitled to reimbursement from the 
U.S.F.G. without a funding cap (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2004). In 
contrast, TANF is administered as a block grant program in which U.S. States are provided 
with a determined amount of Federal funding but allowed greater discretion over the way the 
funding is spent. As an ideological matter, whereas AFDC focused primarily on providing 
families with the means to survive, TANF emphasizes employment and makes welfare 
temporary in nearly all cases (Golden, 2005).  
Through TANF U.S. States use U.S.F.G. block grants to operate their own programs. States 
can use TANF dollars in ways designed to meet any of the four policy objectives set out in the 
Federal law (Covin, 2005), which are to: (1) provide assistance to needy families so that 
children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) end the 
dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, 
and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and 
                                            
10  The Emergency Assistance Program provided short-term emergency assistance to needy families. This 
assistance was not dependent upon participation in AFDC. 
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establish annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these 
pregnancies; and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. 
The shift from AFDC to TANF marked more than a move from an open-ended cash-assistance 
program to a temporary-assistance program. TANF also introduced the practice of allowing 
welfare funding for programs aimed at influencing the family structure, including family 
planning and two-parent-family maintenance programs. This change reflects a shift in poverty 
reduction strategies in the United States. Whereas AFDC was designed to provide needy 
families with cash transfers that would supplement or replace employment income, TANF 
focused on the importance of work as well as attempting to foster nuclear families as a way to 
provide family economic stability.  
 
4.2 The role of state discretion 
PRWORA provided U.S. States with unprecedented discretion over welfare programming and 
funding. Under TANF, there are no Federal rules that determine the amount of TANF cash 
benefits that must be paid to a participating family. Additionally, there are no Federal rules 
that require U.S. States to use TANF to pay families cash benefits at all, however, all States 
do (Falk, 2007). Benefit amounts are determined solely by the U.S. States. The discretion 
provided to States through TANF has allowed for a great diversity in the way that welfare 
programs are funded and administered across the country. Each U.S. State has different 
initial eligibility thresholds, benefit payment amounts, and fund allocations.11 
According to Falk of the Congressional Research Service (2007), in January of 2005, for the 
average cash welfare family (a family of three), the maximum monthly benefit in the median 
state was $389, with a range from $923 in Alaska to $170 in Mississippi (Falk, 2007). The 
maximum monthly cash benefit is usually paid to a family that receives no other income (no 
earned or unearned income) and who complies with program rules. Families with income 
other than TANF are often paid a reduced benefit amount. The diversity in program 
administration also extends to the initial eligibility threshold. Initial eligibility thresholds for 
families of three range from $1,641 in Hawaii to $269 in Alabama (Welfare Rules Database, 
2006).  
State discretion has also created significant diversity in the way that TANF dollars are spent 
across the U.S. States particularly with reference to the level of cash benefits provided. The 
variation in the use of TANF funding spent on cash assistance ranges from 64 percent in 
Maine to only 12 percent in Illinois (Falk, 2007). Similarly, while several U.S. States decline to 
spend any of their TANF dollars on Family Formation programs such as encouraging two-
parent families and decreasing out-of-wedlock births, New Jersey allocates 34.8 percent of its 
TANF dollars on Family Formation expenditures (Falk, 2007).  
The discretion provided to U.S. States through the passage of the 1996 welfare law allowed 
for a huge amount of variety in program and funds administration, with very few Federal 
guidelines. Subsequently, there are different welfare programs being administered in every 
U.S. State. These programs are having mixed results in aiding the families who, currently or 
formerly, receive assistance through TANF and make it difficult to evaluate welfare reforms 
success as a whole.  
Several commentators feared that TANF might set off a “race to the bottom,” where states, 
fearful of attracting low-income families from other states, might lower benefits, which in turn 
would cause others states to lower theirs. In fact, total AFDC/TANF spending on cash benefits 
declined from a peak of about $40 billion in 1995 to about $21 billion in 2006 (Table 2), but 
this reduction is roughly proportional to the welfare caseload reduction (Scholz et al, 2008, p. 
10). 
 
                                            
11  A State's initial eligibility threshold considers all the State's financial eligibility rules regarding applicants, the 
limitations placed on gross income, the rules for deductions from gross income in determining net income, 
and any limitations placed on net income (The Urban Institute, 2004). Initial eligibility thresholds vary 
considerably across U.S. States. 
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4.3 Funding  
Under TANF, the funding relationship between the U.S.F.G. and the individual U.S. States 
changed. The drastically increased level of State discretion over Federally granted funds 
changed the ways in which States governments were spending welfare dollars and the degree 
to which the U.S.F.G was providing funding to the states. By allocating block grant funding to 
U.S. States, TANF removed almost all Federal eligibility and payment rules and provided U.S. 
States with wide discretion over programming, as well as the right to deny benefits to families 
(Blank, 2002). 
Under AFDC, U.S States were entitled to unlimited Federal funds. The Federal government 
provided reimbursement of benefit payments at "matching" rates that were inversely related 
to a U.S. State‘s per capita income (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2004). 
U.S. States were required to provide aid to all persons who were eligible under the Federal 
law and whose income and resources were within the state-set limits (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 1996).  
Under TANF, however, there is no guarantee of benefit provision. PRWORA simply mandated a 
fixed budget amount that the U.S.F.G would grant to the U.S. States each year (the base 
amount of the yearly block grant has been $16.5 billion since 1996) (Congressional Budget 
Office, 1996). U.S. States are required to contribute, from their own funds, at least $10.4 
billion in total under what is known as a “maintenance-of-effort” (MOE) requirement. The 
1996 law also created supplemental grants for certain States with high population growth or 
low block grant allocations relative to their needy population, as well as a contingency fund to 
help States during a recession (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2009). U.S. States that 
need or use more than the amount that has been granted for a particular year are not entitled 
to Federal reimbursement for excess expenditures. Conversely, States that do not use all of 
their annual funding are allowed to carry over unused dollars from one fiscal year to the next 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996).  
The AFDC program was funded specifically and solely to provide cash assistance to needy 
families. The corresponding JOBS and EA programs supplemented AFDC by providing 
vocational training and short term-emergency program funding, respectively (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). Under TANF, however, States may direct 
Federal funding toward any program that is within TANF’s objectives, including programming 
that would have formerly been funded through the JOBS or EA programs. In the absence of 
Federally mandated cash assistance requirements, many U.S. States have opted to spend less 
on cash assistance and more on the other programming that falls under the provisions of 
TANF such as childcare, or work support programs. Thus, with the transition from AFDC to 
TANF the number of families receiving income assistance fell sharply. In 2003, most TANF 
funds, more than 60 percent, were spent on areas other than income assistance (Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities, 2009). In fiscal year 2007 the U.S. spent 30 billion dollars on 
TANF. (This number includes both the federal expenditure and the Maintenance of Effort 
(MOE) funding). Only 30.2 percent of TANF dollars went toward providing families with cash 
assistance (28.4 percent to other services; 19.1 percent to child care; 12.4 percent to other 
work support and employment programs; 8.3 percent to systems and administration; and 1.6 
percent to transportation) (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2009). 
Our Annex C shows this variety among U.S. States in using TANF dollars. As a result, 
government aid across the nation varies remarkable; see Annex D. As millions of people seek 
aid, they are finding a complex system that reaches some and rejects others for 
‘unpredictable’ reasons. For example, the share of poor children and parents (below 100 
percent of the poverty line) that receive cash welfare ranges from 2 percent in Idaho and 
Wyoming to over 45 percent in Main, California and Vermont – U.S. average amounts 21 
percent. See Figure 3. 
 
To conclude, the increased discretion of U.S. States over the use of their Federal welfare 
dollars has decreased the provision of cash assistance to needy families. U.S. States are 
opting to utilize Federal funding to provide assistance to needy families through means other 
than direct cash transfers.  
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Figure 3: Share of poor children and parents that receive cash welfare, 2009 
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Source: Deparle and Ericson (2009) 
 
 
4.4 Eligibility 
The 1996 welfare reform also had a significant impact on eligibility for assistance. Under 
AFDC, the U.S.F.G. provided cash assistance along with education and training programming 
indefinitely so long as a family qualified under the eligibility criteria. One of the most striking 
ways that TANF limited eligibility was through the implementation of time limits, this aspect of 
eligibility is discussed in section 4.5. In addition to establishing time limits, PRWORA tightened 
eligibility requirements both by providing U.S. States with the discretion to deny benefits and 
by reducing the base population who were eligible to receive Federal assistance.  
Prior to welfare reform, persons meeting financial eligibility requirements under AFDC were 
provided cash benefits from the government. AFDC did not include restrictions based on 
marital status or citizenship. Minor, unwed mothers as well as persons convicted of drug-
related crimes were provided unrestricted benefits under the former welfare program. Legally 
residing immigrants were also eligible for benefits under AFDC. There were no limits on the 
size of a family that could be eligible for AFDC benefits, therefore, when an additional child 
was born, families were provided with additional benefits.  
PRWORA imposed new conditions and restrictions to program participation. Since the passage 
of welfare reform, persons who have been convicted of a drug-related crime are prohibited for 
life from receiving benefits under TANF. Unmarried minor parents are provided benefits only if 
living with an adult or if in an adult-supervised setting and participating in education and 
training programs (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). U.S. States were 
given the discretion to exclude both legal immigrants who were new applicants to welfare as 
well as the right to exclude even those legal immigrants already receiving assistance under 
the prior welfare program (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). While the 
Federal guidelines under TANF do not limit eligibility based on family size, the policy does 
provide individual U.S. States with that discretion (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2004).  
 
4.5 Time limits 
The most notable eligibility change through the passage of PRWORA might be the 
implementation of time limits in establishing the duration for which a family can qualify for 
benefits. Under TANF, families who have received Federally-funded assistance for five 
cumulative years are ineligible for additional Federal cash assistance. This means that even if 
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employment adequate to provide family stability is not found, at the end of five cumulative 
years, families are removed from the program and can never again participate. 
AFDC’s designation as an entitlement program ensured that U.S. States would receive funding 
from the U.S.F.G. as long as the States adhered to the Federal requirements. Benefits were 
then guaranteed to eligible participants in the AFDC program (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 1996) Moreover, under AFDC, program participants remained eligible as 
long as they met the program’s established rules. Because there were no time restrictions to 
participation in AFDC, families remained eligible for cash assistance as long as they were 
below the initial eligibility threshold established by each individual U.S. State and continued to 
meet the program requirements issued by the U.S.F.G. and the U.S. State of residence.  
The establishment of time limits is one of the most consequential changes affecting families 
on welfare in the United States. The U.S. minimum wage plays a role in the ability of less-
skilled workers to earn adequate incomes even if fully employed.12 The inability to find 
employment at a living wage and maintain it while addressing health issues and child care 
have caused barriers for families in establishing financial security, particularly single-mother-
headed-households (Primus et al, 1999). In spite of these difficulties, welfare does not 
provide Federal benefits to participants once the time limit has expired.13 TANF does not 
ensure that after the program eligibility time limit is tolled, that participating families have 
secured work that will enable them to provide basic necessities or even offset the cost of 
childcare or transportation that work requires.  
Moreover, recipients who reach the time limits or who are sanctioned for not finding a job are 
being denied cash assistance even though they are willing to work, simply because they 
cannot find any employer to hire them. This labor demand problem will increase during 
recessions and will remain even in good economic times because employer demands for a 
skilled work force continue to escalate. Note that the “time limit and out” system differs 
markedly from a “time limit followed by a work-for-welfare opportunity of last resort” initially 
proposed by President Clinton’s advisors, but rejected by Congress (Danziger, 2002a). 
 
4.6 Work requirements and activities 
Although education, work participation and financial security were objectives of U.S. welfare 
policy both before and after welfare reform, the 1996 welfare reform placed greater 
responsibility on the families receiving program benefits to find stable and sufficiently paying 
work. To enable families to achieve this goal TANF provided additional support targeted at 
finding and maintaining employment.  
Directly following welfare reform, U.S. States drastically altered their welfare programming to 
assist families in establishing employment (Golden, 2005). One such change made by U.S. 
States was a shift toward “work-first” welfare systems that reduced skills development and 
education programs while emphasizing job-readiness and employment search training 
(Golden, 2005). U.S. States also moved toward “making work pay” through incentivizing work 
participation by raising eligibility thresholds or adding earned income tax credits. Additionally, 
U.S. States toughened sanctions and time limits to enforce the message that welfare would 
provide only temporary assistance (Golden, 2005). 
Under AFDC, in fiscal year 1994, 40 percent of two-parent households receiving benefits were 
required to participate in 16 hours of work activity per week in order to continue participation 
in AFDC’s cash assistance program. Before the passage of PRWORA, the percentage of 
households required to meet the 16 hour work requirement was scheduled to increase to 75 
percent in fiscal year 1997 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). In 
addition to the 16 hour requirement imposed on some participants, all AFDC recipients were 
                                            
12  According to the U.S. Department of Labor, the Federal minimum wage is $6.55 per hour effective July 24, 
2008. The Federal minimum wage provisions are contained in the Fair Labor Standards Act. Many U.S. 
States also have minimum wage laws. In cases where an employee is subject to both the State and Federal 
minimum wage laws, the employee is entitled to the higher of the two minimum wages. 
13  States are allowed to exempt a minority of people from time limits and are allowed to continue paying 
benefits through State funds. 
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required to participate in JOBS unless they were exempt from the program. A recipient would 
be exempt from JOBS participation if he or she either worked for 30 hours or more per week; 
attended school full-time; cared for a very young child or elderly family member; or were 
under age 16 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996).  
In contrast, under TANF, work participation standards require that the head of household in a 
single parent family work at least 20 hours per week and in the case of two parent families, 
parents are required to work 30 hours per week in order to remain eligible for cash 
assistance. Eligible work includes: subsidized or unsubsidized employment, on-the-job 
training, education programs, and community service. Hours spent in vocational education 
can count towards the weekly work requirement but only in a minority of U.S. States and only 
for a total of 12 months. (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996).  
However, States are provided some flexibility in meeting their work requirements. The TANF 
statute requires U.S. States to have 50 percent of their caseload meet the established work 
participation standards. In addition to the aforementioned standards, there is a separate 
participation standard that applies to two-parent families, requiring 90 percent of the State’s 
two-parent family participants to meet work participation standards (Falk, 2007). States that 
fail the TANF work participation standards are penalized by a reduction in their Federal block 
grant amounts. However, the statutory work participation standards are reduced by a 
“caseload reduction credit”.14 The caseload reduction credit reduces the participation standard 
one percentage point for each percent decline in the caseload (Falk, 2007).  
Welfare reform and the implementation of TANF centered on the importance of work in 
providing families with economic stability. The policy intended to provide support through 
programming for five years, while participants were able to gain employment and economic 
security. The programs established to assist poor families with job preparation and work-force 
engagement have been the source of a significant amount of welfare reform’s praise. 
However, because programs vary from one U.S. State to the next, the degree to which the 
work related programs assist families is also varied.  
 
  
5. EVALUATING WELFARE REFORM 
 
Following the passage of PRWORA U.S. social policy analysts and economists have surveyed 
the impact of welfare reform on helping needy families in the U.S. move out of poverty. This 
is a difficult task, due to the discretion provided to U.S. States through TANF and the resulting 
diversity in programming and implementation. There have been varied opinions about TANF’s 
success in assisting the nation’s poorest families. Research institutions and universities have 
developed new and diverse proxies for examining the extent to which welfare reform has 
been successful in meeting the needs of low-income families in the United States as well as 
for identifying the reform’s failures.  
Often the reduced number of families receiving cash assistance through TANF is cited as 
evidence of the success of the 1996 welfare reform. Other frequently cited indications of 
success include the increase in employment rates and the decrease in child poverty that took 
place during the 1990’s (Parrott and Sherman, 2006). However, this analysis only provides 
part of the information needed to evaluate the success of welfare reform in the United States. 
The following sections provide a review of data and literature evaluating welfare reform’s 
success in supporting families moving from welfare and into work, and ensuring employment 
and financial security for poor families in the United States.  
 
                                            
14  Though less than half of federal and state expenditures are associated with cash welfare, the “TANF 
caseload” number is the number of families and recipients receiving cash welfare. Information is not 
available on families and individuals who receive TANF benefits and services other than cash welfare. In 
September 2006, 1.9 million families, consisting of 4.6 million recipients, received TANF- or MOE-funded 
cash welfare (Falk, 2007). 
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5.1 Employment trends 
Some of the employment trends observed after welfare reform are positive. More welfare 
recipients are employed while receiving welfare benefits than they were in the past; 
increasing from 22 percent in 1997 to 33 percent in 1999. While these numbers have fallen in 
recent years, they have still not dropped to the levels that they were before welfare reform 
(Golden, 2005). However, a number of studies have found that even with increased work 
participation rates that welfare and former welfare recipients are struggling to establish 
financial security.  
One of the primary goals of welfare reform was for participants to establish “stable, long-term 
work patterns”, under the assumption that regular involvement in work will improve their 
well-being. The justification for establishing only temporary assistance is that this approach 
provides support and impetus for families to become stably employed which will be in the best 
interest of the participating families. Indeed, studies indicate that employment among former 
welfare recipients has actually increased since welfare reform was enacted, and that when 
recipients leave the TANF program their employment rate is 5 to 10 percent higher than when 
they left AFDC (Danziger et al, 2000).  
In the late 1990’s, when families left the welfare system, they were more likely to have at 
least one working adult than they were prior to the implementation of TANF (Golden, 2005). 
However, in the tougher labor market of 2002 and 2003, the proportion of former welfare 
recipients in the workforce fell from 63 percent in 1999 to 57 percent in 2002 (Golden, 2005). 
Evaluations of welfare-to-work typically report that while most participants are able to secure 
initial employment, a large proportion, often a majority, lose those jobs within a year 
(Danziger et al, 2000). Additionally, low wages among welfare recipients remain a concern. 
While recent research suggests that wages of former welfare recipients grow over time, this 
phenomenon occurs among only the minority of former recipients who are able to establish 
regular, stable full-time work patterns (Danziger et al, 2000).  
A study conducted by Danziger et al (2000) found that the former welfare recipients with the 
most work participation and experience have higher levels of financial success and subjective 
well-being than those without employment. However, they also found that there were a large 
number of respondents who suffered from financial hardship regardless of their level of work 
involvement. The study concluded that employment is associated with “reductions in, but not 
the elimination of, economic vulnerability and material hardships” for welfare and former 
welfare recipients in the United States. 
 
5.2 The effect of the economy 
The fact that PRWORA was passed during a time of rapid and sustained economic growth 
complicates efforts to determine the extent to which certain phenomena such as increased 
employment and decreased poverty levels can properly be attributed to welfare policy reform. 
In the United States between 1992 and 2000 the labor market increased by 20 million jobs 
(Blank, 2000). The U.S. unemployment rate fell to 5 percent in early 1997, and remained at 
or below that level until October of 2001 (Blank, 2002). Many businesses experienced worker 
shortages in the years following the passage of the 1996 legislation, making employers 
increasingly open to hiring ex-welfare recipients. Additionally, wages among less skilled and 
less educated workers started to rise in 1995, for the first time since the late 1970s. 
During this time, less-educated, single mothers increasingly joined the workforce; whereas 62 
percent of this population was employed in 1995, by 2000, 73 percent were working (Kaushal 
et al, 2006). While this is impressive growth, the extent to which it can be attributed to 
welfare reform remains ambiguous. Welfare reform policies might have increased the number 
of women in the workforce through job training and work incentives, but it is unclear to what 
degree the increase was a result of policy, and to what degree it was the result of a strong 
economy (Blank, 2000).  
Recent evidence suggests that the economic expansion of the mid to late 1990s may account 
for a significant percentage of the positive trends observed among needy families during this 
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time. While the booming economy of the 1990’s correlated with a decrease in child poverty 
and an increase in low-educated single parents joining the workforce, those numbers have 
begun to drop in recent years following the recession in 2003 (Sherman et al, 2004). 
Moreover, attributing the successes of the mid-90’s to the implementation of TANF is also 
improbable for the reason that to do so would suggest that the 1996 reform yielded almost 
immediate results. Kaushal et al (2006), suggest that given that some policies might have 
delayed results, it becomes even more difficult to attribute the success of the 1990’s solely to 
welfare reform and the implementation of TANF.  
  
5.3 The very poor and single mother headed households 
While welfare reform, along with a robust and incredibly successful economy, may have 
initially decreased child poverty and increased some employment rates, the reform had an 
unintended and significant negative effect on the very poor. Haskins (2000) found that “there 
is a small to moderate-sized group of mother-headed families that are worse off than they 
were before welfare reform”. Shortly after TANF was implemented, the nation’s poorest 
families were not benefiting from the success of the economy or the policies of welfare 
reform. Primus et al (1999) found that from 1995 to 1997 disposable income for the poorest 
20 percent of the population declined by 7.6 percent and the poorest 10 percent of the 
population experienced a 15.2 percent decline in discretionary income. 
Following welfare reform, the number of single mothers in the United States who were 
receiving cash assistance through TANF fell by two million. However, employment among 
single mothers grew by only one million (Parrott and Sherman, 2006). Therefore, in the 
United States there were one million unemployed single mothers who were not receiving any 
cash assistance from the government. This number is almost double what it was before 
welfare reform (up from 6,000,000) (Parrott and Sherman, 2006). The size of this group grew 
from 9.8 percent of participants leaving the program in 1999 to 13.8 percent in 2002 (Golden, 
2005). The population of single-mothers who are both disconnected from employment and 
government cash assistance is significantly more likely to be in poor physical and mental 
health as well as less-ready for employment than those who left welfare for job opportunities 
(Golden, 2005)  
A qualitative study of conducted on TANF recipients in Maine analyzed the barriers to 
employment that prevented single mothers from being able to establish and maintain work. 
The study, by Butler (2008), looked at women who were participating in the TANF program 
but who were struggling to maintain stable employment. Butler’s study identified several 
social and health issues that prevented the women in her study from achieving steady 
employment. The three most prevalent phenomena observed were domestic violence; raising 
children with disabilities; and long-term physical and mental health problems (the latter 
affecting 33-44 percent of TANF recipients nation-wide). Butler also found that not only are 
welfare recipients disproportionately affected by these issues, but often must cope with more 
than one simultaneously.  
  
5.4 Program participation 
Reduced program participation is often presented as evidence that welfare reform is working 
to move people out of poverty. However, there are concerns with using reduced welfare 
caseloads as a proxy for welfare reform’s success. While increased work involvement has 
certainly accounted for reduced participation in the TANF program, Parrott and Sherman 
(2006) point out that, despite the reduction in caseloads, in recent years the number of 
children living below half of the poverty line has grown significantly. While the number of 
families in this category has increased, the rate at which eligible families are receiving TANF 
benefits has declined. Even when considering non-cash benefits such as food assistance, the 
number of children in families living below half of the poverty line has grown significantly 
(Danziger, 2002b). 
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This increased deep poverty (people living below 50 percent of the poverty line) is a 
concerning trend. While child poverty remains below the levels that were seen in the years 
immediately preceding the welfare reform of 1996, the growing rates of intense poverty raise 
doubts about TANF’s ability to reach the most impoverished families. Before the 1996 welfare 
reform, the AFDC program lifted 64 percent of otherwise deeply poor children out of deep 
poverty. Conversely, in 2005, the TANF program lifted just 23 percent of deeply poor children 
above 50 percent of the poverty line (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2009). TANF 
programming does not seem to be addressing the needs of the poorest families in the United 
States, which is evidenced both through the increase in deep poverty and the rates at which 
this population is participating in TANF.  
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program15 and the Medicaid Program, which provide 
food stamps and healthcare respectively, have continued to assist a growing number of low-
income families, while TANF participation has continued to drop (Parrott and Sherman, 2006). 
The Congressional Budget Office (2005) reports that unlike the trends seen in program 
participation in TANF, the other four major poverty reduction initiatives have seen significant 
growth in participation over the last several years. Moreover, as of 2003, each of these 
programs served more low income families, than did TANF. In addition to serving more people 
than the major welfare legislation, the U.S.F.G also provides more funding for the other four 
major poverty reduction programs. In 2005, The federal government spent $22 billion on 
TANF, compared with $30 billion on Food Assistance, $39 billion on Supplemental Security 
Income benefits and $45 billion for the Earned Income Tax Credit; see Annex A. 
The number of families who are eligible to participate in TANF, but who do not, is remarkably 
high not only with reference to participation in other poverty reduction programs, but also 
when compared with AFDC. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(2008) in 2005 only 40 percent of families who were eligible for TANF assistance participated 
in the program. This is a significant change. Prior to welfare reform, more than 80 percent of 
families that qualified for AFDC participated in the program. Moreover, a simple linear trend 
shows that participation of AFDC/TANF decreased over 4 points each year in the period 1993-
2005. See Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Rates of participation in AFDC and TANF by families that meet eligibility 
requirements 
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Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Indicators of Welfare Dependence), 2008 
                                            
15  Commonly referred to as food stamps. Gross monthly income eligibility limits are set at 130 percent of the 
poverty level for the household size. Net monthly income limits are set at 100 percent of poverty (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, 2009). Participation in the food stamps program is 
not taken into account when measuring a household’s poverty, as food stamps are not a cash benefit. 
Following the 1996 Welfare Reform, participation in this program includes a work requirement. 
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Thus, the decline in welfare caseloads, a figure frequently marshaled as proof of welfare 
reform’s success, does not indicate that low-income families are better and more successful 
than they were before welfare reform, but rather, that poor families are simply not 
participating in the program. As stated by Parrott and Sherman (2006): “More than half - 57 
percent- of the decline in TANF caseloads since 1996 is due to a decline in the extent to which 
TANF programs serve families that are poor enough to qualify, rather than to a reduction in 
the number of families who are poor enough to qualify for aid.” 
 
5.5 TANF benefits and inflation 
There are also significant concerns about the degree of help that TANF is providing to the 
families who are participating in the program. The basic TANF block grant that the U.S.F.G. 
makes available has been set at $16.5 billion since it was established in 1996 (Falk, 2007). As 
a result, the real value of the block grant has already fallen by about 27 percent (Center for 
Budget and Policy Priorities, 2009). In addition, twenty three U.S. States have maintained the 
same benefit level since fiscal year 2000 without making adjustments for inflation.  
 
Table 3: Basic TANF Block Grant in Constant FY1997 Dollars 
 
Fiscal Year Value of the Block Grant in 
Billions of FY1997 Dollars 
Cumulative Loss in Value 
(in percent) 
1997 16.5 - 
1998 16.2 -2 
1999 15.9 -3 
2000 15.4 -6 
2001 14.9 -9 
2002 14.7 -11 
2003 14.4 -13 
2004 14.1 -15 
2005 13.6 -17 
2006 13.1 -20 
2007 12.9 -22 
2008 12.6 -24 
2009 12.3 -25 
2010 12.1 -27 
 
Note:  Constant dollars were computed using the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U). 
Actual inflation was used to compute constant dollars for FY1997-FY2006 using data from the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Constant dollars for FY2007 through FY2010 are based on the inflation 
assumptions of the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), published in January 2007.  
 
Source: Falk Report for the Congressional Research Service (2007) 
 
 
A study by Schott and Levinson (2008) found that TANF benefits have declined in real 
(inflation adjusted dollars) in nearly every U.S. State since the passage of PRWORA. The same 
study found that even those U.S. States that have adjusted benefit levels upwards under 
TANF have not kept pace with the increased costs of basic needs. When adjusting for inflation 
using the Consumer Price Index, 48 States have lower real dollar benefit levels now than they 
did in 1996 when TANF was enacted. In the 19 States where TANF benefits have remained 
the same since welfare reform, TANF benefits in 2009 are worth 25 percent less, in inflation-
adjusted terms, than they were in 1996. In other words, TANF benefits do less to help 
families rise out of extreme poverty than they did in 1996. In 2008, 20 States had benefit 
levels below 25 percent of the Federal poverty line, which is nearly twice as many states as 
had benefits below 25 percent of the poverty line in 1996 when TANF replaced Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (Schott and Levinson, 2008). The families who are participating in 
TANF are receiving benefits that do little to help them move out of poverty and the rate to 
which it is helping is decreasing.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
Poverty alleviation is an important objective of European countries and of the United States. 
However, while these wealthy states have highlighted poverty as a serious problem, and while 
they have established varied systems in an attempt to address it, significant poverty remains. 
While poverty is witnessed in both the United States and in Europe, the United States remains 
an outlier; with high poverty rates and low social spending. The difference between the U.S. 
and Europe is both policy-based and ideological. In 1996, the U.S. moved further toward a 
system that values work participation and that limits federal assistance to those who will not 
or cannot establish employment. Throughout this paper we have attempted to offer a primer 
in the differences between poverty definitions and the subsequent poverty rates in the United 
States and Europe. We have looked at the United State’s primary cash-transfer programs and 
their reform, and we have reviewed the literature regarding some of the outcomes of the 
U.S.’s 1996 welfare reform; namely the implementation of TANF. 
When PRWORA was passed in 1996, it might have been the ideal time for welfare reform for 
political and pragmatic reasons. On the political side, there was a growing sentiment that 
AFDC was creating a population of welfare recipients that relied primarily on the government 
for financial support. With regard to the feasibility of reform, the economic climate at the time 
was such that there were more opportunities for less-skilled and low-income workers to 
secure employment at better wages than had been available in the past. Against this 
background, welfare caseloads fell dramatically after the mid-1990s. Some of this decline is 
undoubtedly due to welfare reform, some to the non-welfare policy changes, some to the 
booming economy, and some to the interactions among them. However, it is a difficult task to 
evaluate U.S. welfare reform, because with the passage of PRWORA and the increase in U.S. 
State discretion, there are different programs, eligibility requirements, and benefit amounts in 
every U.S. State. We found huge variation across U.S. states, depending on ability to pay and 
preferences to meet a certain level of social standard and other (social) objectives such as 
child care, work support and employment programs.  
The 1996 welfare reform emphasizes American preference for work. PRWORA represented a 
shift in the way the United States attempts to address poverty, as well as a general change in 
the philosophy about how poverty reduction strategies should be implemented. Although the 
welfare reform increased work, earnings of most individuals who left welfare were still below 
the poverty line, even many years after their exit. Another drawback of this work-first 
approach is the termination of cash assistance after 5 years, especially for vulnerable groups 
with low skills. In the wake of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (which altered spending on a 
number of social service programs) States are beginning to provide low-income families, even 
those families who have left the TANF program, with additional resources.16 These resources 
are often designed to create incentives to work by providing supplemental payments to a 
families’ employment-earned household income. Since the passage of the Deficit Reduction 
Act in 2005, one third of U.S. States have established supplemental support programs, with 
various eligibility rules and benefit amounts (Schott and Levinson, 2008).  
Still, 12.5 percent of U.S. population was living in poverty in 2007. Our interpretation of the 
literature is that welfare reform policies (TANF) had limited success in reducing poverty. With 
the troubled economy and shrinking job market nowadays, low-income families need 
significantly more support. Supplemental cash assistance programs and education and job 
training that aid less-skilled workers in both finding and sustaining employment, will be 
necessary for welfare reform in the United States to be successful in reducing poverty. If 
moving people from welfare to work is the goal of U.S. welfare policy, it is important to 
ensure that a living wage can be obtained through work, and that the costs of childcare and 
                                            
16  The welfare reform law was reauthorized by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 and extended until 2010. The 
Deficit Reduction Act was intended to reduce mandatory (entitlement) Federal spending (Medicare, 
Medicaid, Food Stamps, farm subsidies, etc.) through changes in program requirements set by revised or 
new Federal laws. In some cases it allows for spending on new programming by providing more State 
discretion on programs and spending.  
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transportation do not exceed the income gained through employment. Moreover, one could 
argue that recipients who reach time limits without meeting work requirements should be 
offered a chance to work in community service jobs in return for cash assistance (cf. Danziger 
and Danziger, 2005, p. 10).  
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Annex A: Total means-tested benefits by program, 1970-2007 (constant 2007 dollars, millions) 
 
 
Medicaid SSI 
AFDC / 
TANF 
EITC 
Food 
Stamps 
Housing 
Aid 
School 
Food 
Programs 
WIC 
Head 
Start 
1970 28,264 15,706 26,522  2,938 2,693 3,631  1,740 
1971 34,281 16,413 30,728  7,796 3,922 4,711  1,843 
1972 41,235 16,825 35,337  8,915 5,734 5,784  1,867 
1973 44,004 15,962 35,552  9,953 7,710 6,251  1,871 
1974 46,574 22,063 34,113  11,432 7,671 6,350 44 1,699 
1975 51,820 22,653 36,589 4,817 16,901 8,197 7,405 344 1,557 
1976 55,348 22,104 39,154 4,719 19,410 9,125 7,879 520 1,607 
1977 59,753 21,576 39,569 3,856 17,337 10,288 8,245 876 1,625 
1978 61,904 20,836 37,649 3,333 16,343 11,700 8,484 1,207 1,988 
1979 63,779 20,206 34,640 5,860 18,507 12,292 8,834 1,501 1,942 
1980 65,504 19,982 33,806 4,997 21,944 13,789 9,101 1,831 1,849 
1981 69,132 19,601 33,058 4,361 24,247 15,650 8,459 1,988 1,867 
1982 68,780 19,297 31,398 3,814 21,934 17,326 7,043 2,039 1,959 
1983 73,413 19,577 32,136 3,737 23,216 19,670 7,419 2,344 1,899 
1984 76,297 20,698 32,067 3,269 21,345 20,052 7,414 2,770 1,987 
1985 78,884 21,312 31,523 4,024 20,703 21,971 7,274 2,870 2,072 
1986 85,856 22,855 32,530 3,801 20,063 21,644 7,488 2,995 1,968 
1987 91,878 23,638 33,686 6,189 19,165 20,585 7,570 3,066 2,063 
1988 96,538 25,195 33,329 10,334 19,541 22,306 7,415 3,150 2,114 
1989 103,592 24,592 32,869 11,028 19,513 23,374 7,192 3,195 2,065 
1990 116,856 25,533 34,929 11,965 22,436 24,559 7,054 3,367 2,462 
1991 141,898 27,370 36,739 16,906 26,360 25,816 7,503 3,503 2,971 
1992 159,884 31,416 39,320 19,253 30,895 27,748 7,929 3,843 3,254 
1993 175,594 34,686 38,795 22,294 31,576 30,702 8,089 4,059 3,984 
1994 188,054 39,577 40,369 29,527 31,827 33,303 8,384 4,434 4,653 
1995 197,086 38,263 40,939 35,313 30,971 37,330 8,469 4,675 4,808 
1996 201,091 36,247 37,257 38,092 29,654 35,231 8,577 4,883 4,717 
1997 204,730 38,911 29,944 39,258 25,254 35,775 8,766 4,966 5,142 
1998 214,967 39,629 27,365 41,138 21,485 36,490 9,055 4,949 5,530 
1999 229,230 40,016 27,042 39,702 19,626 34,406 9,187 4,901 5,797 
2000 242,736 42,689 27,221 38,887 18,041 34,663 9,099 4,795 6,342 
2001 263,782 36,856 28,284 39,075 18,202 35,201 9,297 4,863 7,259 
2002 287,003 41,456 26,920 44,026 21,041 38,087 9,722 5,002 7,534 
2003 306,092 39,094 25,756 43,561 24,120 39,785 9,979 5,098 7,513 
2004 320,552 39,586 22,900 43,931 27,022 40,145 10,335 5,364 7,436 
2005 332,818 39,532 21,972 45,025 30,329 40,035 10,589 5,301 7,265 
2006 319,476 39,997 21,052  31,047 39,084 10,542 5,217 6,979 
2007         30,373 39,436 10,891 5,450   
 
Abbreviations:  
Medicaid =medical assistance for aged, blind, disabled, certain pregnant women or dependent children 
SSI = Supplemental Security Income (federally-administered cash assistance for aged, blind and disabled)  
AFDC = Aid to Families with Dependent Children  
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families  
EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit  
WIC = supplemental nutrition program for women, infants and children 
 
Source: Scholz et al (2008, pp. 48-49) 
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Annex B: Number of recipients means-tested benefits by program, 1970-2007 (thousands) 
 
 
Medicaid SSI 
AFDC / 
TANF 
EITC 
Food 
Stamps 
Housing 
Aid 
School 
Breakfast 
School 
Lunch 
WIC 
Head 
Start 
1970     8,466   4,340   450 22,400   477 
1971    10,241  9,368  800 24,100  398 
1972 17,606  10,947  11,109  1,040 24,400  379 
1973 19,622  10,949  12,166  1,190 24,700  379 
1974 21,462 3,996 10,864  12,862  1,370 24,600 88 353 
1975 22,007 4,314 11,346 6,215 17,064  1,820 24,900 344 349 
1976 22,815 4,236 11,304 6,473 18,549  2,200 25,600 520 349 
1977 22,832 4,238 11,050 5,627 17,077 2,398 2,490 26,200 848 333 
1978 21,965 4,217 10,570 5,192 16,001 2,643 2,800 26,700 1,181 391 
1979 21,520 4,150 10,312 7,135 17,653 2,842 3,320 27,000 1,483 388 
1980 21,605 4,142 10,774 6,954 21,082 3,032 3,600 26,600 1,914 376 
1981 21,980 4,019 11,079 6,717 22,430 3,431 3,810 25,800 2,119 387 
1982 21,603 3,858 10,258 6,395 21,717 3,619 3,320 22,900 2,189 396 
1983 21,554 3,901 10,761 7,368 21,625 3,857 3,360 23,000 2,537 415 
1984 21,607 4,029 10,831 6,376 20,854 4,081 3,430 23,400 3,045 442 
1985 21,814 4,138 10,855 7,432 19,899 4,225 3,440 23,600 3,138 452 
1986 22,515 4,269 11,038 7,156 19,429 4,336 3,500 23,700 3,312 452 
1987 23,109 4,385 11,027 8,738 19,113 4,461 3,610 23,900 3,429 447 
1988 22,907 4,464 10,915 11,148 18,645 4,530 3,680 24,200 3,593 448 
1989 23,511 4,593 10,993 11,696 18,806 4,632 3,810 24,200 4,119 451 
1990 25,255 4,817 11,695 12,542 20,049 4,710 4,070 24,100 4,517 541 
1991 28,280 5,118 12,930 13,665 22,625 4,786 4,440 24,200 4,893 583 
1992 30,926 5,566 13,773 14,097 25,407 4,830 4,920 24,600 5,403 621 
1993 33,432 5,984 14,205 15,117 26,987 4,959 5,360 24,900 5,921 714 
1994 35,053 6,296 14,161 19,017 27,474 5,035 5,830 25,300 6,477 740 
1995 36,282 6,514 13,418 19,334 26,619 5,130 6,320 25,700 6,894 751 
1996 36,118 6,614 12,321 19,464 25,543 5,104 6,580 25,900 7,186 752 
1997 34,872 6,495 10,376 19,391 22,858 5,132 6,920 26,300 7,407 794 
1998 40,649 6,566 8,347 20,273 19,791 5,082 7,140 26,600 7,367 822 
1999 40,300 6,557 6,824 19,259 18,183 5,154 7,370 27,000 7,311 826 
2000 42,887 6,602 5,778 19,277 17,194 5,104 7,550 27,300 7,192 858 
2001 46,164 6,688 5,359 19,593 17,318 5,123 7,790 27,500 7,306 905 
2002 49,329 6,788 5,064 21,703 19,096 5,268 8,150 28,000 7,491 912 
2003 51,971 6,902 4,929 22,024 21,259 5,231 8,430 28,400 7,631 910 
2004 55,002 6,988 4,745 22,270 23,858 5,172 8,900 29,000 7,904 906 
2005   7,114 4,492 22,752 25,718 5,139 9,360 29,600 8,023 907 
2006   7,236   26,672 5,192 9,770 30,100 8,088 909 
2007        26,466 5,108 10,160 30,600 8,285   
 
Abbreviations:  
Medicaid =medical assistance for aged, blind, disabled, certain pregnant women or dependent children 
SSI = Supplemental Security Income (federally-administered cash assistance for aged, blind and disabled)  
AFDC = Aid to Families with Dependent Children  
TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families  
EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit  
WIC = supplemental nutrition program for women, infants and children 
 
Source: Scholz et al (2008, pp. 50-51) 
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Annex C:  U.S. State Use of TANF and MOE Funds as a Percent of Total Federal TANF and State 
MOE Funding, fiscal year 2005 
 
  Cash 
Assistance 
Admin Work 
Program 
Child 
Care 
Transfer 
to CCDF 
Other Work 
Supports 
Family 
Formation 
Other Transfer 
to SSBG 
Alabama 34 9 11 5 3 3 1 26 8 
Alaska 44 6 13 14 16 1 1 2 3 
Arizona 50 12 6 3 0 1 0 21 7 
Arkansas 24 10 16 19 10 7 3 7 3 
California 55 9 7 10 6 2 0 8 2 
Colorado 33 9 1 1 1 4 0 46 7 
Connecticut 26 6 5 3 0 4 15 36 6 
Delaware 32 10 0 40 -7 21 0 0 4 
Florida 18 9 8 23 12 1 1 24 6 
Georgia 22 4 16 4 0 3 6 43 3 
Hawaii 55 10 14 7 7 1 0 0 7 
Idaho 15 4 15 2 18 1 5 38 3 
Illinois 12 2 8 41 0 2 0 33 2 
Indiana 36 13 2 5 2 13 1 29 1 
Iowa 38 7 9 3 13 2 4 18 6 
Kansas 36 5 1 4 12 20 0 19 2 
Kentucky 39 6 10 8 20 2 0 15 0 
Louisiana 23 12 6 2 9 4 23 14 7 
Maine 64 4 2 10 6 9 0 2 4 
Maryland 33 10 8 8 0 27 6 2 6 
Massachusetts 40 3 2 22 11 9 0 7 6 
Michigan 31 7 6 17 10 0 8 19 3 
Minnesota 33 11 17 10 6 14 0 10 0 
Mississippi 25 5 14 5 18 12 7 6 9 
Missouri 36 6 9 18 8 0 2 15 6 
Montana 42 11 24 3 4 0 1 12 4 
Nebraska 62 7 14 8 10 0 0 0 0 
Nevada 47 23 2 6 0 8 1 13 2 
New Hampshire 49 10 12 6 8 2 2 7 5 
New Jersey 44 8 5 3 0 5 35 0 2 
New Mexico 47 5 8 2 19 1 1 17 1 
New York 39 9 5 2 9 17 1 16 3 
North Carolina 20 7 12 22 16 1 0 21 1 
North Dakota 33 10 8 7 0 4 7 31 0 
Ohio 30 12 7 21 0 2 1 20 7 
Oklahoma 15 7 0 28 14 12 2 15 7 
Oregon 39 10 8 4 0 6 0 33 0 
Pennsylvania 31 7 14 10 9 3 2 22 2 
Rhode Island 41 8 4 29 5 0 0 13 1 
South Carolina 29 8 22 2 1 3 3 24 8 
South Dakota 36 9 11 3 0 0 2 34 7 
Tennessee 40 10 9 10 19 2 0 7 3 
Texas 20 13 9 3 0 0 1 47 7 
Utah 41 18 28 9 0 1 0 1 3 
Vermont 44 8 1 10 11 18 0 1 6 
Virginia 47 15 17 7 1 2 0 6 5 
Washington 41 7 15 11 16 1 0 8 1 
West Virginia 32 19 2 15 0 7 11 6 8 
Wisconsin 22 7 6 32 12 12 3 3 3 
Wyoming 19 3 1 8 10 7 0 52 0 
U.S. (unweighted 
average States) 
35 9 9 11 7 6 3 17 4 
 
Abbreviations:  MOE = States are required to contribute, from their own funds, at least $10.4 billion in total under 
what is known as a “maintenance-of-effort” (MOE) requirement. Admin = Administrative 
Expenditures; CCFD =Child Care and Development Fund; SSBG = Social Service Block Grant 
 
Source: Falk (2008). Congressional Research Service based on data from the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services. 
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Annex D: Variations in U.S. Government Aid Across the Nation, 2009 
 
 
Share of poor 
children and 
parents that 
receive cash 
welfare a 
Share of 
unemployed 
that receive 
benefits 
Share of 
eligible 
households 
that receive 
housing 
benefits 
Share of 
eligible 
people that 
receive food 
stamps 
Share of 
uninsured 
poor adults 
covered by 
government 
programs a 
Share of 
uninsured low- 
income children 
covered by 
government 
programs b 
Alabama 10 41 38 66 45 83 
Alaska 24 51 26 63 36 81 
Arizona 18 35 19 61 43 67 
Arkansas 7 55 34 77 33 83 
California 47 43 21 50 37 73 
Colorado 8 26 23 54 30 57 
Connecticut 31 51 34 65 54 78 
Delaware 22 58 34 73 53 71 
Florida 7 38 23 62 30 56 
Georgia 6 36 33 68 36 73 
Hawaii 25 50 26 72 49 83 
Idaho 2 67 29 57 44 73 
Illinois 9 43 30 79 38 77 
Indiana 29 46 32 74 43 83 
Iowa 28 49 35 71 48 86 
Kansas 23 37 34 59 43 82 
Kentucky 15 36 38 78 45 81 
Louisiana 5 32 39 75 37 76 
Maine 46 37 41 96 69 86 
Maryland 25 45 32 60 37 69 
Massachusetts 38 64 35 61 63 86 
Michigan 32 46 31 80 50 86 
Minnesota 35 42 37 69 54 75 
Mississippi 7 32 42 63 39 72 
Missouri 29 35 33 98 45 79 
Montana 11 52 32 62 43 70 
Nebraska 24 40 33 67 40 75 
Nevada 14 49 17 54 25 51 
New Hampshire 28 37 34 68 38 76 
New Jersey 27 67 28 60 33 62 
New Mexico 17 49 31 71 39 69 
New York 32 48 32 63 55 81 
North Carolina 7 46 29 67 42 73 
North Dakota 22 33 37 57 43 70 
Ohio 23 37 33 70 50 81 
Oklahoma 6 29 32 69 31 77 
Oregon 21 57 25 85 35 72 
Pennsylvania 31 66 33 75 54 77 
Rhode Island 40 43 39 55 57 85 
South Carolina 9 44 33 74 45 76 
South Dakota 12 19 45 58 42 79 
Tennessee 30 33 35 91 49 83 
Texas 6 25 28 63 27 61 
Utah 8 35 28 56 32 64 
Vermont 49 50 35 80 61 85 
Virginia 18 29 31 69 34 71 
Washington 32 40 24 75 47 82 
West Virginia 14 45 42 83 47 89 
Wisconsin 14 65 29 67 51 83 
Wyoming 2 35 39 53 40 77 
U.S. average 21 44 30 67 41 73 
 
a Below 100 percent of the poverty line.  
b Below 200 percent of the poverty line. 
 
Source: Deparle and Ericson (2009)
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